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ABSTRACT
To copy or not to copy, to exploit the famous celebrity image
or not to exploit it; these are the questions. The message of the
modern legal world communicated through multiple voices in
the academy is that copying often is perfectly acceptable and
even laudable. An artist or designer might conclude that it is
both legal and ethical to use whatever you can, use whatever you
can get away with, and use it until you get sued for using it. Yet
plagiarism in the arts and sciences is nearly universally
condemned.
This Article proposes an ethical approach to the use of
copyrighted works and names, images, and likenesses protected
by the right of publicity. This approach is based on the ethical
requirements of the law as synthesized from the cases presenting
concrete narratives concerning fair and appropriate uses of
protected works, names, and images. My thesis may be summed
up in a revised form of the KISS principle (Keep it simple,
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stupid!) known as DIOS MIO:
DIOS MIO
Don’t Include Other’s Stuff
or
Modify It Obviously
Although simplified to this acronym, the ethical
considerations concerning copyright-protected works and right
of publicity-protected names and images are far from simple.
The advice of this Article reflects the convergence of
predominant
purpose
analysis
and
transformative/
transformation analysis in copyright and right of publicity law
that has led to a single set of recommendations for the legal and
ethical treatment of protected works and celebrity names,
images, and likenesses: seek first to create and not to copy or
exploit, and create new expression by obvious modification of the
old expression and content.
I. INTRODUCTION TO DIOS MIO ........................................... 91
II.DON’T INCLUDE OTHER’S STUFF—THE ETHICS OF
CREATION ....................................................................... 92
A. Bridging the Disconnect Between Plagiarism
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I. INTRODUCTION TO DIOS MIO
Should ethical designers or artists seek to steal and exploit
as much copyrighted material and valuable celebrity names,
images, and likenesses as they can get away with? Should an
ethical approach to copyright and right of publicity law start
with an examination of how best to exploit the legal defenses or
gaps in coverage in the law or with a calculated analysis of how
unlikely it would be to be sued? Do the voices of the legal
academy who speak about the benefits of copying also
encourage plagiarism in artistic creation?1 My answer to all of
these questions is “no.”
Copyright is the intellectual property protection of original
and creative works including designs, images, writings, and
artistic creations. Right of publicity is a right to control the use
of a person’s name, image, or likeness under legal theories that
draw from intellectual property law, equity, privacy law, and
property law. I have synthesized the law of copyright, right of
publicity, and plagiarism, and both the legal rules and the
narratives of case law applying the legal rules to actual,
concrete situations that have arisen under the law to define a
legal and ethical approach to the copying of others’ works and
aspects of their persona. This explanatory synthesis defines a

1. See Reuven Ashtar, Theft, Transformation, and the Need of the
Immaterial: A Proposal for a Fair Use Digital Sampling Regime, 19 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 261, 318 (2009); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement
Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1444–45 (1989) [hereinafter Merits of
Copyright]; Ashley M. Pavel, Reforming the Reproduction Right: The Case for
Personal Use Copies, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1615, 1642 (2009); John
Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an
Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1254–55; Rebecca
Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545–46 (2004) [hereinafter
Copy This].
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legal course that avoids stealing and exploiting the works or
the good names and valuable images of other artists and
celebrities. The proper, ethical concern of designers and artists
should be whether it is appropriate in a legal and ethical sense
to replicate works or images and likenesses at all, and if so,
how the use should treat the underlying borrowed works,
images, or likenesses.
An ethical approach to the use of copyrighted works and
names, images, and likenesses protected by the right of
publicity may be summed up in a revised form of the KISS
principle (Keep it simple, stupid!) known as DIOS MIO:
DIOS MIO
Don’t Include Other’s Stuff
or
Modify It Obviously
Although simplified to this acronym, the ethical
considerations concerning copyright-protected works and right
of publicity-protected names and images are far from simple.
Fortunately, the same requirements of copyright law that call
for the creation of original, copyrightable works also provide
the incentive not to plagiarize because plagiarism most often
produces unoriginal and, therefore, uncopyrightable works. In a
similar way, an alteration of a copyrighted work or a valuable
celebrity name, image, or likeness that creates new, original
expression that predominates over the expression in the
original not only fulfills originality requirements and avoids
plagiarism but also would constitute a fair use of the original
copyrighted work or celebrity name, image, or likeness. DIOS
MIO reflects the current convergence of predominant purpose
analysis and transformative/transformation analysis in
copyright and right of publicity law that has led to a single set
of recommendations for the legal and ethical treatment of
protected works, names, and images.
II. DON’T INCLUDE OTHER’S STUFF—THE ETHICS OF
CREATION
A. BRIDGING THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN PLAGIARISM AND
COPYING FOR SELF-EXPRESSION OR SELF-ACTUALIZATION
The concept of plagiarism ties the act of copying with the
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motivation of exploitation,2 and thus it focuses attention on the
ethics of using other people’s valuable works or their names,
images, or likenesses. The legal world hates plagiarism,3 but
often seems to admire or even encourage certain types of
copying.4 Plagiarism is held to be unethical,5 even morally
reprehensible,6 an offense carrying the badge of moral
turpitude7 that can suspend an attorney’s license8 or deliver a
2. Plagiarism is an act of theft, a misappropriation of the ideas of others
combined with explicit or implied misattribution to oneself to gain some
advantage. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (9th ed. 2009); see also
K.R. ST. ONGE, THE MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 51–62 (1988).
3. See Carol M. Bast & Linda B. Samuels, Plagiarism and Legal
Scholarship in the Age of Information Sharing: The Need for Intellectual
Honesty, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 777, 780–81 (2008) (describing the views of the
Legal Writing Institute and Judge Richard A. Posner); Lisa G. Lerman,
Misattribution in Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and
Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 467, 467–68 (2001) (listing penalties for
plagiarism in law school); Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Tangled Web of Plagiarism
Litigation: Sorting Out the Legal Issues, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 245, 246–47
(noting problems for faculty plagiarism); Laurie Stearns, Copy Wrong:
Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 80 CAL. L. REV. 513, 529 (1992)
(“A plagiarist, by falsely claiming authorship of someone else’s material,
directly assaults the author’s interest in receiving credit.”); see also Stuart P.
Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 218–19 (2002) (analyzing the legal comparison between
plagiarism and theft).
4. See, e.g., Merits of Copyright, supra note 1, at 1382–83; Pamela
Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles Project:
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1192–93, 1228–29
(2010); Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 609, 645–49 (2006); Copy This, supra note 1, at 568–74.
5. JOSEPH GIBALDI, MLA STYLE MANUAL AND GUIDE TO SCHOLARLY
PUBLISHING 151 (2d ed. 1998) (“Plagiarism is a moral and ethical offense
rather than a legal one.”); Bast & Samuels, supra note 3, at 790; Kim D.
Chanbonpin, Legal Writing, The Remix: Plagiarism and Hip Hop Ethics, 63
MERCER L. REV. 597, 601 (2012); see also Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical
Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 264 (2008)
(explaining that extensively citing legal sources is acceptable, but that there is
a fine line between citation and plagiarism).
6. Velez v. Alvarado, 145 F. Supp. 2d 146, 160–61 (D.P.R. 2001)
(reprimanding lawyer for verbatim copying of a judge’s opinion and order);
Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Plagiarism: Legal and Ethical Implications for the
University, 37 J.C. & U.L. 1, 19, 29–50 (2010); Cooper J. Strickland, Recent
Development, The Dark Side of Unattributed Copying and the Ethical
Implications of Plagiarism in the Legal Profession, 90 N.C. L. REV. 920, 932–
33 (2012).
7. Darby Dickerson, Facilitated Plagiarism: The Saga of Term-Paper
Mills and the Failure of Legislation and Litigation to Control Them, 52 VILL.
L. REV. 21, 58 (2007); Latourette, supra note 6, at 19.
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death sentence to a student’s or academic’s working life.9
Nevertheless, copying is sometimes described as a form of
expression that facilitates communication in fulfillment of First
Amendment values,10 and to that extent, copying might be
defended as a vehicle of self-expression and self-actualization,11
and an activity that furthers artistic growth and advances the
arts.12
8. See In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549, 550–53 (Ill. 1982) (upholding the
suspension of an attorney’s license for plagiarizing parts of an L.L.M. thesis);
Iowa Sup. Ct. Atty. Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon, 789 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Iowa
2010) (noting that the plagiarism amounted to a material misrepresentation);
Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 297–98
(Iowa 2002) (censuring a lawyer for claiming fees for work that was largely
plagiarized). Cf. In re Zbiegien, 433 N.W.2d 871, 871–72 (Minn. 1988) (finding
that a student who plagiarized a paper during law school should be admitted
to the bar).
9. ST. ONGE, supra note 2, at 39; Deborah R. Gerhardt, Plagiarism in
Cyberspace: Learning the Rules of Recycling Content with a View Towards
Nurturing Academic Trust in an Electronic World, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14
(2006); Latourette, supra note 6, at 7 (“[S]ome academics regard plagiarism as
a capital offense potentially meriting the academic death knell for students
and for faculty.”); Kevin J. Worthen, Discipline: An Academic Dean’s
Perspective on Dealing with Plagiarism, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 441, 442–44
(2004); see also RALPH D. MAWDSLEY, ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT: CHEATING AND
PLAGIARISM 2–3 (1994) (noting that the punishments necessarily differ based
on the position of the plagiarist).
10. See supra note 1.
11. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533,
1535–37 (1993); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) (discussing the importance of freedom of expression);
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 54–60 (1960); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990–91 (1978); Alan
Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the
Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093, 1110–11 (1991); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s
Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 415–17 (2003); Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1982). Several
justices have spoken eloquently on the importance of free speech. See, e.g.,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation,
and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 488 (2007) (“[P]roblems arise from the
reality of borrowing and other techniques that involve some degree of copying
as important elements in the creation of new works.”); David A. Simon,
Culture, Creativity, & Copyright, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 322–25
(2011); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART & COMMERCE THRIVE
IN A HYBRID ECONOMY 17–19 (2009); KEMBREW MCLEOD ET AL., CREATIVE
LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 11–16 (2011); Julie E.
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In order to bridge the obvious disconnect between the
abhorrence of plagiarism and the toleration or tacit
encouragement of certain forms of copying, the study of law and
ethics must recognize that plagiarism has been associated with
the theft of ideas and the words and images that embody and
express those ideas for the purpose of gaining an advantage—
personal or professional credit, recognition, an academic grade,
or remuneration—as a result of that theft.13 Thus, plagiarism is
a form of exploitation, but one that is primarily concerned with
the theft and misattribution of ideas and insights to the credit
of the plagiarist.14 Plagiarism is a form of kidnapping and
enforced servitude of abducted ideas15—the activity of an
intellectual press-gang that shanghais a crew of ideas and
Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1151, 1179–80 (2007) [hereinafter Creativity and Culture] (noting methods
that creativity can stem from a shared cultural heritage); Julie E. Cohen, The
Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2005);
Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 304 (1992); Liane Gabora, The
Origin of Evolution of Culture and Creativity, 1 J. MEMETICS § 5 (1997),
available at http://www.imagomundi.com.br/cultura/memes_gabora.pdf (“The
ideas and inventions any one individual produces build on the ideas and
inventions of others.”).
13. See Green, supra note 3, at 173 (noting that plagiarism does not credit
the original source); David A. Thomas, How Educators Can More Effectively
Understand and Combat the Plagiarism Epidemic, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
421, 422–23 (noting that plagiarism definitions must work around traditions
of acceptable and unacceptable copying). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 11 (2007) (considering plagiarism as not
necessarily literary theft). The Legal Writing Institute’s definition of
plagiarism specifically refers to “literary property,” describing plagiarism as
“[the t]aking [of] the literary property of another, passing it off as one’s own
without appropriate attribution, and reaping from its use any benefit from an
academic institution.” LEGAL WRITING INST., LAW SCHOOL PLAGIARISM V.
PROPER ATTRIBUTION 2 (2003) [hereinafter LAW SCHOOL PLAGIARISM],
available at http://www.lwionline.org /publications/plagiarism/policy.pdf.
14. See Green, supra note 3, at 174–75; see also Thomas, supra note 13, at
426–28 (describing reasons why a student might decide to plagiarize another’s
work); POSNER, supra note 13, at 11–12 (noting that theft is a misleading term
but that classifying it as “borrowing” is also misleading).
15. The term “plagiarism” comes from the Latin word “plagiarius,”
meaning a kidnapper. LANGENSCHEIDT’S POCKET LATIN DICTIONARY 242
(1966); see also Katharina de la Durantaye, The Origins of the Protection of
Literary Authorship in Ancient Rome, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 37, 71 (2007); Jaime
S. Dursht, Note, Judicial Plagiarism: It May Be Fair Use But is it Ethical?, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1253, 1263 (1996) (citing WEBSTER’S NEW DICTIONARY OF
THE LANGUAGE 803 (1966)); Stearns, supra note 3, at 517 (citing 11 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 947 (2d ed. 1989)).
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forces them to work for the abductor.16 Plagiarism in the arts
and literature involves: (1) an intentional taking, (2) of creative
literary or artistic works of another, (3) without attribution, (4)
passing them off as one’s own, (5) without adding significant
artistic or literary value to the copied material, and (6) with the
potential to reap an unearned benefit or earn an undeserved
credit from the use.17
The form of “naked copying” favored by commentators is
copying that furthers First Amendment goals of communicating
expression about culture, or one’s personal human condition, or
other educational, historical, and archival uses of prior works.18
Certain forms of copying—for archiving, transmission of
knowledge, education, and self-expression—have enormous
societal benefits that rival the public policies supporting the
protection of intellectual property.19 There is a balance that
must be struck when determining the limits of a copyright
monopoly that curtails many forms of copying including the
kinds of copying that benefit society. But nothing in this
equation supports plagiarism. Plagiarism is neither a
prescription nor a substitute for the creative goals of artists
and designers who attempt to create works for the benefit of
being known for and credited with the content of the works.20

16. See Durantaye, supra note 15, at 71 (“The term initially referred to
the kidnapping of free men and the selling of them into slavery.”); Dursht,
supra note 15, at 1263 (“In Roman law, plagium was the act of stealing a slave
from his master and was a criminal offense.”); Stearns, supra note 3, at 517
(“The image [of plagiarism] is more nearly that of abduction into
servitude . . . .”); see also ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY
95 (1952).
17. See LAW SCHOOL PLAGIARISM, supra note 13, at 2; Stearns, supra note
3, at 516–17; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Creativity and Culture, supra note 12, at 1174–76; Guy
Pessach, [Networked] Memory Institutions: Social Remembering, Privatization
and its Discontents, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 82–83, 135–38 (2008);
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2565–
76 (2009); John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and
the IP (Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4–
5, 48–49 (2011); Copy This, supra note 1, at 545–48.
19. Cf. supra note 18 and accompanying text.
20. See Green, supra note 3, at 200–05; Stearns, supra note 3, at 543–44;
Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural
Creativity, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 151, 155–56 (2007) [hereinafter
Payment in Credit] (“[F]an creators are usually highly concerned with proper
attribution. Plagiarism . . . is one of the most serious offenses against the fan
community, and when the plagiarism is discovered, fans are likely to publicly
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Furthermore, “[w]hen a public figure is charged with
plagiarism, the public concern is not primarily about protecting
the possessory interests of the ‘owner’ of the stolen [works].
Instead, society sees itself as the victim of duplicity and is
interested in passing judgment on the character of the
plagiarist.”21 Plagiarism does not benefit society; it is a cheat
and a fraud upon society.22
Part of the confusion concerning the contours of copyright
protection compared to the scope of the concept of plagiarism
arises from the different policies supporting the two concepts.23
Plagiarism is not about the issue of who should be able to
exploit a valuable property right so much as it is concerned
with the fairness of taking credit for ideas and insights one did
not think up or imagine, and thereby cheating not only the true
original thinker, but the entire community that bestows credit
and accolades on original thinkers.24 Authors have described
plagiarism as a defect in process and copyright infringement as
a defect in result.25 Plagiarism has a mental component of
cheating and intentional misrepresentation or misattribution,
while copyright infringement has no mental component and
only focuses on the end product and whether it is a copy or an
unauthorized derivative work of the original regardless of the
mental state of the copyist.26 In plagiarism, the end product has
excoriate the plagiarist.”).
21. Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 1171, 1185 (2005).
22. See id. at 1184–85. “[C]ontrary to the impression one might gain from
reading the many judicial opinions that conflate copyright infringement with
plagiarism, there is no law prohibiting plagiarism and misattribution
generally.” Id. at 1210–11.
23. See Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar, Attribution, and
Plagiarism, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3–6 (2005); Green, supra note 3, at 200–01;
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Plagiarism Problems in Higher Education, 13 J.C. & U.L.
65, 87–90 (1986) [hereinafter Plagiarism Problems].
24. See Dursht, supra note 15, at 1263–66; Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 14–
16; Green, supra note 3, at 234–35 (noting the effect on scholars who are
plagiarized); Latourette, supra note 6, at 21; Stearns, supra note 3, at 529; see
also Payment in Credit, supra note 20, at 155–56 (explaining the importance of
lack of attribution or “credit” in plagiarism analysis compared to the
unimportance of attribution in copyright-intellectual property analysis).
25. Dursht, supra note 15, at 1270 n.113; Stearns, supra note 3, at 524–
25.
26. See LINDEY, supra note 16, at 232; Jon M. Garon, Normative
Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1290–91 (2003) (explaining that copyright is tied to the
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little to do with the charge—even clever paraphrasing and
creative compilations of other people’s thoughts would
constitute plagiarism if the copyist has the mental state to steal
and take credit for the stolen thoughts.27 Plagiarism is not a
crime,28 but a violation of ethics, morality, and equity,29 and an
act of fraud or negligent misrepresentation.30 Plagiarism, like
other forms of piracy, receives little aid and comfort from legal
theorists.31
Artists and designers also might be confused by the fact
that the scopes of enforcement of plagiarism and copyright
infringement do not completely overlap.32 Plagiarism primarily
is an ethical offense, not a crime or civil wrong, while
unauthorized copying of creative works has been regulated by
laws of intellectual property and, in particular, the copyright
laws.33 Strangely enough, unlike plagiarism, willful copying for
reaping of unearned benefits); Latourette, supra note 6, at 22 (explaining that
the intent of plagiarism is essential); Stearns, supra note 3, at 516–17. But see
Green, supra note 3, at 181–86 (noting that requiring intent could give some
plagiarists room to avoid punishment).
27. Dursht, supra note 15, at 1281 (“[P]lagiarism focuses on the process of
copying.”); Latourette, supra note 6, at 22; Stearns, supra note 3, at 516–17.
28. Dursht, supra note 15, at 1258 (explaining that plagiarism is an
ethical offense often prohibited by academic ethics codes); Latourette, supra
note 6, at 18–19 Green, supra note 3, at 228–35, (discussing the propriety of a
change in the law to criminalize plagiarism).
29. See Bast & Samuels, supra note 3, at 790; Dursht, supra note 15, at
1256; Latourette, supra note 6, at 19; see also Yu v. Univ. of La Verne, 126
Cal. Rptr. 3d 763, 767–68 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011); Hanifi v. Board of Regents,
46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 131, 135 (1994) (noting plagiarist’s admissions that such conduct
is unethical); In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549, 551–52 (Ill. 1982); Iowa Sup. Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Iowa 2002); In re
Zbiegien, 433 N.W.2d 871, 879 (Minn. 1988) (Kelley, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority ruling allowing plagiarist to be admitted to the
bar).
30. ST. ONGE, supra note 2, at 101; see also Lane, 642 N.W.2d at 300.
31. See, e.g., MARCEL C. LAFOLLETTE, STEALING INTO PRINT: FRAUD,
PLAGIARISM, AND MISCONDUCT IN SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING 1 (1992); LINDEY,
supra note 16, at chs. 10, 14, 15; Robert D. Bills, Plagiarism in Law School:
Close Resemblance of the Worst Kind?, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 103, 103
(1990); Dursht, supra note 15, at 1281.
32. Band & Schruers, supra note, 23, at 3–6; Bast & Samuels, supra note
3 at 790; Green, supra note 3, at 200–02; Samuel J. Horovitz, Note, Two
Wrongs Don’t Negate a Copyright: Don’t Make Students Turn it in if You Won’t
Give It Back, 60 FLA. L. REV. 229, 255–58 (2008); Plagiarism Problems, supra
note 23, at 87–88.
33. Bast & Samuels, supra note 3, at 790–91; Merits of Copyright, supra
note 1, at 1465; Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the
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personal gain and commercial distribution has been defined as
a criminal offense.34
The public policy behind the copyright laws is “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”35 Additionally, “[i]ts
constitutional goal is to promote enlightenment, not retard it—
‘to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge.’ The
property rights it establishes must ‘ultimately serve the cause
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and
the other arts.’”36
Copyright has carved out specific areas in which copying is
held to be perfectly legal—the creation and recognition of a
public domain (or public domains),37 the doctrine of originality
with the supporting doctrines of merger and scènes à faire,38

Scènes à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779,
785–86 (2006) [hereinafter Copyright Originality] (“The artist or author’s
creative expression and embodiment of the idea is protected.”).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006); see also Steven K. Barton, Note, Felony
Copyright Infringement in Schools, 1994 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 144–48
(describing the elements necessary for the criminal offense); Geraldine Szott
Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality,
Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 736–37 (2003).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
36. James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
167, 218 (2005) (citations omitted).
37. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture:
Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 124–
135 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 59–64 (2003); M. William Krasilovsky,
Observations on the Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 205,
205–06 (1967); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967–
68 (1990); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 215, 217–22 (2002); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse
on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 784 (2006) (mentioning the possibility
of multiple public domains); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public
Domain: Threats and Opportunities, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter &
Spring 2003, at 147, 148–53; see also David Lange, Recognizing the Public
Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 passim (1981) (arguing that the
scope of the public domain must be clear from encroachment by intellectual
property rights).
38. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[B][3]–[4] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2012); Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright:
The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 91–92 (1989); Douglas
Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 734–39 (2003);
Lateef Mtima, So Dark the Con(Tu) Of Man: The Quest for a Software
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and the definition of what is infringement versus what is fair
use39—to facilitate legally-recognized acts of copying.
Because the overlap between plagiarism and copyright
infringement is incomplete, an act of plagiarism may or may
not be an act of copyright infringement, and the converse also
is true.40 This is particularly true in the visual arts because
copyright law precludes ideas from being copyrighted (i.e., from
being protected from copying), and infringement requires the
copying to be of a work, which is an expression of the ideas.41 If
an act of copying implicates the theft of ideas and
misattribution of a prior author’s ideas and insights to the
credit of the copyist, it may well constitute an act of
plagiarism.42 It will not constitute an act of copyright
infringement unless the scenario includes the copying of a

Derivative Work Right in Section 117, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 23, 94–99 (2007);
Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 788–98.
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (defining fair use); Barton Beebe, An
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 549, 551–57 (2008) (using statistical analysis to describe the
contradictions in fair use case law); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 140 (1999) (describing how it is impossible to
determine whether use is fair before litigation because of a balancing test);
Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 745–
49 (2009); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1106–07 (1990) (noting many gaps in fair use jurisprudence); Michael D.
Murray, What is Transformative? An Explanatory Synthesis of the
Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair
Use Law, 11 CHIC.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260 (2012) [hereinafter What is
Transformative?] (discussing how an explanatory synthesis demonstrates the
operation of the transformative test); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense
of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 719–20 (2011) (critiquing the four
factor test used by courts); R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the
Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 467–69 (2008); Elizabeth
L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317,
334–36 (2011); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 53–63
(2012) (empirical study of fair use); Samuelson, supra note 18, at 2539–41
(comprehensive study of fair use doctrine’s unpredictability).
40. See Band & Schruers, supra note 23, at 3–6; Bast & Samuels, supra
note 3, at 790; Green, supra note 3, at 200–02; Horovitz, supra note 32, at
255–58; Plagiarism Problems, supra note 23, at 87–88.
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also Jon M. Garon, Playing in the
Virtual Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and Identity Reconceptualized Through
Virtual Worlds and Computer Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 465, 477–78 (2008);
Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 788–90; Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond
Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 725, 758 (1993).
42. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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particular form of expression of the ideas. Copying of public
domain works or any copying permitted by the originality
doctrines and fair use defenses will not be infringement, but it
may well constitute plagiarism if the copyist potentially will
receive personal recognition or benefit as the “creator” of the
copied material.43 On the other hand, outside of the protections
of the doctrines of originality and the public domain, and the
fair use defenses mentioned here, the copying of one author’s
work and incorporating it into a new work might constitute
infringement no matter if the copyist gives proper attribution
and recognition to the author and source of the copied material
to such a degree that there is no possibility of a finding of
plagiarism in the scenario.
The distinction between plagiarism and copyright
infringement is more powerful in theory than in practice.44
Plagiarism almost always involves the copying of expression—
we would be at a loss to know what ideas have been taken by
the plagiarist if not for the ability to trace the plagiarist’s
expression to its unacknowledged source. In some disciplines of
the arts and sciences, a plagiarist might steal an actual idea—a
scholarly insight, a scientific discovery, or a historical
conjecture—and attempt to obtain the recognition for the
essential ideas represented by these concepts without much
concern for whether or not the plagiarist actually copied the
original words or forms in which the ideas once were expressed
by the original author of the ideas.45 But in the visual arts, the
concern is with the act of taking another artist’s works—
expressions, not ideas—without attribution and with the intent
of gaining the credit and recognition for an act of creation.46
Taking works, rather than the idea of works, still is an ethical
wrong known as plagiarism even if copyright law does not
afford the original artist or her heirs a cause of action because
the work fell into the public domain or because the strength of
the copyright over the original work was lessened by one of the

43. See supra notes 37–39.
44. See Green, supra note 3, at 181–86 (explaining how unintentional
plagiarism still falls within the scope of plagiarism, even though plagiarism is
often distinguished from copyright by its mental element).
45. See Payment in Credit, supra note 20, at 155–56 (explaining how
proper attribution is considered to be important by the community for fan
created works).
46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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originality doctrines of merger or scènes à faire.47 The
distinction revolves around the wrong defined by plagiarism—
misappropriation with the intent to receive a benefit from the
theft—as opposed to copyright’s concern with allocation of the
rights to use and exploit a valuable property right in
expression. The Parts that follow trace the legal requirements
of copyright law, copyright infringement, and fair use to define
the legal and ethical path for artists and designers with respect
to the works of other artists and designers.
With regard to the right of publicity, very few uses of a
celebrity name, image, or likeness have the tendency to impute
the reputation and good will of the celebrity to the infringer in
the sense that one would admire the person of the infringer for
the same traits and attributes as the celebrity.48 Right of
publicity violations are an exploitation of a celebrity’s name,
image, and reputation, but the benefit sought generally is not
personal or professional credit, an academic grade, or
accolades.49 The infringer does not seek to be known as the
celebrity; he or she merely seeks attention, marketing
advantages, or other benefits from the misassociation of the
star power of the celebrity with the infringer’s own works or
activities. As a result, most violations of the right of publicity
will not also constitute plagiarism. Therefore, simply reminding
artists and designers of the concept of plagiarism is an
incomplete prescription for proper treatment of others’ names,
images, and likenesses.
In the Parts that follow, I have synthesized the ethical and
moral underpinnings of plagiarism with the public policy
underlying copyright and right of publicity law to make a more
complete statement of legal and ethical behavior with respect

47. See supra note 38. In essence, the originality doctrines allow copying
when the material copied was not and could not have been copyrighted. If the
original work is limited by the merger doctrine (there are only a limited
number of ways to express the concept, and both authors used one of these
limited ways), or scènes à faire (both authors used a stock scene, a natural,
realistic depiction of the same object, or some other necessary phrasing or
depiction “that must be done” to express the idea of the scene), then there will
be no grounds for a claim of copyright infringement even if the scenario reeks
of plagiarism. See Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 788–89, 794.
48. See Leval, supra note 39, at 1132 (noting the ease of copying and
undercutting tangible goods, such as fabric patterns, fashion accessories, and
toys).
49. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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to the works and the names and images of other artists,
designers, and celebrities. In spite of the distinctions between
the ethical conception of plagiarism and the legal definitions of
copyright and right of publicity infringement, the end result is
the same recommendation, “Don’t Include Other’s Stuff.”
B. COPYING AS PLAGIARISM UNDER COPYRIGHT AND RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY LAW50
Plagiarism is unethical.51 The act of copying with the
intention and expectation of receiving credit for the copied
material is plagiarism.52 Plagiarism is not excusable as selfexpression or self-actualization when the act of copying is to
gain credit for someone else’s creative act.53
Artists and designers seek to create. The application of the
creative faculties of the mind to the creation of art works and
designs is the exact activity toward which artists and designers
devote their talents. It is easy to understand the measure of
achievement and distinction in the arts and design world: it is
to be known for being original, not derivative, to produce new
works of distinction and individual genius, not to replicate the
works of the past. The appellations, “derivative” or “copycat,” in
the arts and design world are as damning an appellation as
being called a “plagiarist” in the literary and academic world.
Replication is a short-cut, not an achievement of merit.
Fortunately, copyright law recognizes the priority of the
creation of new, non-duplicative, non-derivative works as being
the quintessential achievement for copyright purposes too.
Thus, striving for achievement and distinction in the arts and
design world produces successful legal and ethical results
under copyright law.

50. As mentioned previously, the research that produced this Article was
motivated by an invitation from the National Center for Professional &
Research Ethics to prepare an Ethics CORE Encyclopedia article on ethics and
intellectual property for artists and designers. Michael D. Murray, The Ethics
of Intellectual Property: An Ethical Approach to Copyright and Right of
Publicity Law (July 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013463.
Also
see
information provided in the author’s biography at the beginning of this Article.
51. See supra notes 28–30.
52. See supra notes 3, 12–13, 24 and accompanying text.
53. See Stearns, supra note 3, at 514.
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1. The Copyright Originality Requirement and Its Parallels to
Publicity Law
The creation of original expression is the essential
requirement for a copyrightable work.54 “The sine qua non of
copyright is originality.”55 Originality is the very “premise of
copyright law.”56
The definition of original is “not copied,”57 rather than
something that is entirely new, fresh, novel, and excessively
creative.58 “Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be
original even though it closely resembles other works so long as
the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”59
Nevertheless, this definition feeds directly into the
recommended approach to the fair and ethical use of others’
works: if you do not copy, you will be playing fairly with others’
works and you will be creating works that will be copyrightable
in the process.
Copyright law is concerned only with the copying of words
and images that constitute expressions of ideas.60 In copyright
law, the idea-expression distinction prevents copyright from
quashing new, original expression derived from the ideas
depicted or embodied in other works by forbidding the exercise
of copyright protection over ideas, including themes,

54. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991);
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 247–48 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1973).
55. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
56. Id. at 347 (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d
1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981)).
57. Id. at 346–47; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,
58 (1884); The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
58. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954)
(“[C]opyright protects originality rather than novelty or invention . . . .”). In
contrast, patent protection requires an invention that is novel and nonobvious.
35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2006).
59. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
60. See Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 785–86; Raymond T.
Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Software Copyright: Sliding Scales and
Abstracted Expression, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 317, 323, 331–32 (1995); Pamela
Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 319–20 (2003); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a
Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 684–85,
710–12 (2012) (explaining that copyright began with the protection of words
alone and has struggled to fit images into its scheme).
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techniques, processes, and procedures.61 The idea-expression
distinction preserves certain forms of copying of ideas from
copyright infringement because they result in new, original
expression that is not traced back to an earlier source—in other
words, the artist or designer is not credited with the invention
or conception of the technique, process, or procedure in the arts,
or with the theme, genre, or device in the arts or literature, but
simply with the new, original expression embodying the idea.62
Many artists may follow a formula or genre for artistic or
literary success, and copyright law recognizes that by defining
genre and formula as ideas that may be used by any and all
artists and authors under the idea-expression distinction.63 We
are quite comfortable with hundreds of modern and
contemporary mystery-crime-detective writers and confuse
none of them with Wilkie Collins or Edgar Allan Poe. We are
quite taken with scores of modern and contemporary
impressionistic painters, and confuse none of them with Monet,
Renoir, or Morisot. But a plagiarist seeking recognition for
content—expression—copied from another artist receives our
ire for this unethical trick.64
Right of publicity law defines and protects the right to
control the use of one’s name, image, likeness, or other valuable
attributes of one’s persona by others when others seek to use
these things for personal gain or commercial advantage.65
There is no idea-expression distinction in right of publicity law;
the celebrity’s image and likeness are the subject matter of the
right, and there is no “idea” of a celebrity that is free to all for

61. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also Garon, supra note 41, at 477–
78; Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 788–89; Rotstein, supra note 41, at
758 (noting that courts and scholars have found the distinction difficult to
apply); Haochen Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 265, 307–08 (2007).
62. See Garon, supra note 41, at 477–78.
63. See Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 791.
64. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. Forgery is another
unethical and illegal behavior involving copying, but it is the inverse of
plagiarism because the forger seeks no recognition (or blame) for the copy, and
only seeks to have it falsely attributed to the original artist. See Stearns,
supra note 3, at 517.
65. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2009); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344 (West 1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §
46 (1995); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §
3:2 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY].
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reproduction or new expression.66 Therefore, even expression
that calls the celebrity to mind without reproducing the actual
image or likeness of the celebrity is actionable.67
An element of the right of publicity offense is the gaining of
an advantage from the exploitation of a valuable celebrity
persona, which matches the mental state of plagiarism which
seeks credit or benefit from the exploitation of another’s
valuable ideas.68 The two wrongs are parallel rather than
overlapping, but result in the same ethical recommendation not
to exploit another person for personal gain. This pushes the
discussion toward answering the question of what is
exploitation versus what is fair use, which will be discussed
further below.
2. The Relationship Between Originality and Creativity
Originality is connected to creativity, but only in the
following manner: a copyrightable work must be created—it
must be a work of authorship “founded in the creative powers
of the mind.”69 When combined, the two requirements mean
that a copyrightable work is one that is not copied and is
conceived of by the author.

66. See F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The
“Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right
of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 1, 32–33, 52, 70–71 (2003); Peter Johnson, Can You Quote Donald
Duck?: Intellectual Property in Cyberculture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 451, 462–
63 (2001) (reviewing ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW
(1998)); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of
Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 252–54 (2002); David S. Welkowitz &
Tyler T. Ochoa, Teaching Rights of Publicity: Blending Copyright and
Trademark, Common Law and Statutes, and Domestic and Foreign Law, 52
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 905, 910 (2008); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
67. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1992) (finding that robot animation called to mind Vanna White’s “Wheel
of Fortune” persona); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that product name called to mind Johnny
Carson’s “Tonight Show” persona).
68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
69. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991)
(quoting The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)); see also Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003) (addressing the issue of whether
Congressional copyright extensions address Constitutional requirements for
originality and creativity).
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The works which are to be protected by copyright must be
“the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books,
prints, engravings, and the like.”70 The creativity required does
not have to be at a genius level: “[T]he requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they
possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or
obvious’ it might be.”71
The definition of creativity in copyright law may be
comforting to those who question their own innovativeness and
uniqueness—the law sets a low bar for creative aptitude and
imagination—but the definition does communicate a
meaningful message when coupled with the legal requirement
of originality and the ethical prohibition against plagiarism: it
means your creative inspiration cannot revolve around copying
the work of another artist.
Plagiarism does not automatically produce inferior works—
in fact, although it is ironic to note it, plagiarism of great
works, embodying great ideas, superior technique, and
impressive creativity, often produces a result that is superior in
many ways to works that plagiarists might have produced on
their own.72 The problem is that plagiarized works are not
“new” although they appear to be new, they are not a product of
the hand or the mind of the plagiarist, although they appear to
be, and they are attributed and credited to the plagiarist at the
expense of the original creator in a manner that cheats the
audience of the “new” works.73 In a legal sense, the copyright
originality and creativity elements require works to be new, not
copied, and require a creation that is conceived of by the mind
and executed by the hand or at the direction of the artist.74
Fulfilling these same elements also will avoid a charge of
plagiarism regarding creative works that are to be attributed to
70. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (quoting The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94
(1879)); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211 (noting that there is a narrow
category of works where copyright cannot exist); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
213–15 (1954) (explaining that the scope of such rights is granted by
Congress).
71. Feist, 499 U.S. at 340 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 1.08[C][1], 2.01[A]–[B] (1990)).
72. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 60; Horovitz, supra note 32, at 257–58;
Stearns, supra note 3, at 519.
73. See Stearns, supra note 3, at 519.
74. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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the artist.
3. Plagiarism Is Not the Same As Following Techniques,
Ideas, Methods, or Processes of Creation Under the IdeaExpression Distinction
Artists and designers reading copyright’s requirements
may be puzzled by the apparent disconnect with their own
artistic training and education. Art training involves copying—
one practices the lessons of the past by copying the works of the
past. One demonstrates the development of artistic skills by
showing that one can duplicate the works that exhibit these
skills. Notably:
Although imitation is an inevitable component of creation, plagiarists
pass beyond the boundaries of acceptable imitation by copying from
the work of others without improving upon the copied material or
fully assimilating it into their own work; by failing to attribute the
copied material to its actual author; and by intending to deceive
others about its origin.75

In truth, there is no disconnect between the advice not to
copy and the training an artist receives in arts education.
There is only a clarification: works that an artist wants to
copyright may not be copies of other works, and any works that
are to be offered for sale or for any other personal benefit may
not be copies of other works.76 This not only is advice for the
ethical treatment of other artists, it also is legal advice for how
to produce copyrightable works under the originality
requirement and to avoid liability for copyright infringement.77

75. Stearns, supra note 3, at 520.
76. It is possible that students might be required to complete an
assignment for a grade in school that calls for them to copy certain works—for
example, an assignment or portfolio requirement that contemplates
submission of copied works to demonstrate the mastery of an artistic skill or
the achievement of a certain level of performance. This practice does not
implicate the copyright laws unless the students further attempt to promote
themselves beyond the academic setting using the copied works or if they
attempt to sell or license the copied works outright. See supra notes 34–37 and
accompanying text. In addition, I am not suggesting that plagiarized works or
copied works in general are uniformly acceptable as student work product in
academic settings; in general, plagiarized works would not be acceptable and
would constitute an academic violation. Students must be careful to know and
understand the requirements of their department and institution regarding
the copying of works for academic assignments.
77. See generally LEONARD D. DUBOFF, MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY
KING, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, Booklet P 86–87 (2010) [hereinafter
DUBOFF, MURRAY & KING, DESKBOOK OF ART LAW]; LEONARD D. DUBOFF,
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On the other hand, nothing prevents an artist or designer
from learning from and employing other people’s artistic ideas,
techniques, methods, or processes of creation. As discussed
above, the idea-expression distinction in copyright law allows
ideas to be exploited,78 not works (expressions of ideas).79 The
concept of “ideas” in copyright law encompasses techniques,
methods, procedures, and processes; thus an “idea,” even a
technique or method of creation, can be copied, but not the
works themselves (expressions of the idea) produced using the
technique or method of creation.80 This is a significant
distinction regarding copyright law and the other intellectual
property protections of patent and trade secret law which
protect inventions and innovations.81
An illustration is in order: glass artist A and glass artist B
both work as gaffers (glass blowers and shapers) in the studio
of master glass artist C. Glass artists A and B both study the
methods and techniques of glass blowing and glass shaping
used by the master artist C, and from time to time, they
individually execute and create the glass sculptures conceived
of and designed by the master artist. After several years, both
A and B decide to go out on their own and produce their own
glass sculptures. A uses the techniques learned on the job to
execute and create A’s own conceptions and designs for glass
sculpture, and A produces works that are fully copyrightable
and do not infringe on master artist C’s works because A did
not attempt to copy any of C’s works.82 B, on the other hand,
SHERRI BURR, & MICHAEL D. MURRAY, ART LAW ch. 2 (Aspen 2010)
[hereinafter DUBOFF, BURR & MURRAY, ART LAW].
78. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
79. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349–50 (1991); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also supra note 79.
81. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (discussing patents);
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003)
(discussing trademarks).
82. This scenario intends to focus attention on the copyright issues
presented by the idea-expression distinction and the fact that artistic methods,
techniques, processes, and procedures are not subject to copyright. It is
possible that this scenario could implicate other rights of master artist C, such
as a potential trade-secret right, or it could implicate an employee
confidentiality agreement or covenant not to compete agreement between the
employer and the two employees of this scenario, if such an agreement were in
place between the parties. In theory, C might have patented one or more of the
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sought to gain some attention and obtain a leg up in the glass
art world by going out of his way to use the techniques B
learned in C’s studio to produce works that closely resemble C’s
works. Because B is skillful at glass blowing and because B set
out to copy C’s works, B’s works duplicate C’s works and are
often confused with C’s works at art shows and in galleries. B’s
works may well be held to be copies of C’s works, and thus
unoriginal and not copyrightable, and may further subject B to
liability for copyright infringement of C’s copyrighted works.
The purpose of this illustration is to show that artistic
training in the processes and procedures of other artists is
necessary and expected, and does not lead to copyright
infringement unless and until the trained artist decides to
employ the acquired skills to duplicate or even to closely mimic
the works of other artists.83
Mimicry deserves special attention. On the one hand,
copyright law protects original artists from those who would
seek to mimic the works of the artists through the copyright
derivative works right owned by the copyright owner of the
work.84 On the other hand, the idea-expression dichotomy,
discussed above, allows artists to create works that follow the
same formula, genre, or technique as the works produced by
earlier artists. The ethical, plagiaristic difference is one of
intent while the legal, copyright law difference is one of result.
In plagiarism, as exhibited by artist B in the illustration
above, the second artist sought to make her works appear the
same as master artist C’s works. It was not simply a
resemblance caused by the two artists working in the same
medium using similar techniques. This mimicry was intended

processes and procedures used in C’s studio, in which case neither A nor B
would automatically be entitled to employ the patented procedure in the
creation of their own glass works. The successful patenting of an artistic
process would be the exception, not the rule; it would be much more likely that
C did not obtain a patent and that A and B would have the ability to use all of
the non-patented artistic procedures on their own outside of their employment
with C absent a trade secret or employment agreement restriction that
prevents it.
83. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547–49; see also Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (explaining that
infringement becomes increasingly possible as the level of abstraction becomes
more concrete, and more detail is shared between the original and the alleged
infringing copy).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
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to cause confusion in the audience for the works, the confusion
being that B’s works were produced by C. In copyright law, the
derivative works right affords the owner of the copyright to the
original work the right to make or authorize the creation of all
adaptations, alterations, translations, and conversions of the
original work into new works.85 It protects the original owner
from copyists who seek to produce noticeably similar works
based on the first work, but who make a few variations and do
not exactly duplicate the first work;86 the copyist need only take
a portion of the desirable features (more than a trivial amount,
but not necessarily the heart) of the original work to be guilty
of copyright infringement for creating an unauthorized
derivative work.87 Infringement by the creation of a derivative
work does not require proof of a certain mental state, but the
law will attempt to make distinctions between innocent
practitioners of the same genre, medium, or art form, whose
works share some resemblance, and those who produce
substantially similar looking works that replicate a portion of
the desirable features of the original work. In a perfect world, it
would be obvious and effortless to discern who had copied and
who had simply followed similar techniques common to the
medium or genre of art. In reality, attorneys will solicit proof
that the artist followed completely innocent practices of
creation, or questionable practices of mimicry and outright
plagiarism. Thus, when the inquiry may eventually reach into
the artist’s process of creation—What inspired this work when
you created it? Were you thinking of another work at that time?
Did you look at other works by other artists at that time?—the
advice remains not to set out to copy other artists’ works in the
first place.
Innocently following the method and techniques of a
certain school or genre of art will sometimes result in two
artists producing works that are similar to each other. This
kind of accidental similarity is accepted and permitted under

85. Id.; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220–21 (1990); cf. Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 549–50.
86. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547–49; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
87. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. Compare
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980), with
Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1977). This is a comparison suggested by the Supreme Court in Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 549–50.
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copyright law as long as the similarity is “fortuitous, not the
result of copying.”88 Although the concept of accidental
similarity is known and accepted as a possible occurrence
outside of situations of copying, in cases of substantial
similarity or near-exact-similitude between two works of two
different artists, it may be difficult for the second artist to
convince a court that the similarity was fortuitous, and not the
product of copying. If the second artist had no ability to see or
access the first work, the argument becomes much stronger. If
the second artist never looks to copy or mimic the works of
other artists, the argument practically speaking will be
unnecessary; the likelihood that the second artist will
innocently and accidentally replicate another artist’s works to
the degree of substantial similarity or near-exact-similitude
that would bring a copyright infringement claim to bear is
negligible.
The copyright law doctrines of merger and scènes à faire
also allow for similarity arising from the common subject
matter of two different artists’ works,89 as where the two artists
both attempt to depict the same scene or real-world subject
matter, such as by creating a realistic depiction of an animal, a
flower, the Grand Canyon at sunrise, or a texture-free
application of red acrylic paint on a square, flat canvas. The
term, scènes à faire, roughly translates to “scenes that must be
done”—an “obligatory scene” with necessary elements of
depiction required in order to communicate the meaning of the
depiction to an audience.90 For ethical artists and designers,
the concept means that similarity between two works that is
caused by the requirements of a successful, meaningful
depiction of the same subject matter is acceptable, while
similarity caused by one artist’s copying of the other artist’s

88. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
89. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03[B][4]; see also Kurtz, supra
note 38, at 79, 86, 89–91 (arguing that authors build from their predecessors);
Lichtman, supra note 38, at 734–39 (stating that under the merger doctrine,
copyright protection is denied when there are only a few ways to express an
idea to prevent monopolization of the market); Mtima, supra note 38, at 94–
99; Copyright Originality, supra note 33, at 784–99.
90. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 38, § 13.03; Kurtz, supra note 38, at
86, 89; see also Eva E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of
Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1542–44 (2011) (describing
court interpretations of stock imagery).
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work is not.91 Only the points of similarity directly attributable
to the subject matter are excusable; each artist can protect
their individual artistic rendition and embellishments that
exceed the points of similarity dictated by the subject matter.92
Once again, it might come down to a matter of proof, and
having an honest account of choosing a certain subject matter
and producing the depiction without reference to the work of
any other artist who also depicts this subject matter will put an
artist on a strong footing.
Similarity that is traced to a method of production and not
to an act of copying also is protected by the originality
doctrine.93 Artists cannot obtain a “copyright” over their artistic
processes and procedures, and other artists are free to observe,
adapt, reverse-engineer, and employ even the most innovative
processes and procedures for the creation of original art
without running afoul of the copyright laws.94 Thus, copyright
does not set a trap for students receiving traditional artistic
training in art schools, university departments, and studios
that threatens to turn each project they work on using the
skills they have learned from other artists into a continuous
process of copyright infringement.
4. The Parallels of Plagiarism and the Exploitation of a
Celebrity’s Name, Image, or Likeness
Exploitation through plagiarism parallels the concept of
exploitation through misuse of a celebrity’s name, image, or
likeness in right of publicity law. As discussed above, the
prohibitions parallel each other, but they do not overlap
completely, because the benefits gained by a copyist from the
exploitation of a celebrity’s persona generally are not selfaggrandizing benefits such as professional or academic credit.95
Artists and designers exploit celebrities for the attractive power
91. See Subotnik, supra note 90, at 1543 (arguing that there is an
underlying idea of fairness in using things within the public domain).
92. Id. at 1544 (noting that photographers often use the same subject but
produce different depictions of that subject).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
94. See supra note 83. There is a possibility that the artist would run into
a trade secret, employment agreement, or patent law issue, but not a
copyright issue—unless the second artist copied the actual works of the first
artist. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (exempting processes and procedures from
copyrightability).
95. See supra notes 17, 19, 68 and accompanying text.
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of their name and image or for the symbolic, expressive power
of their persona, but rarely in a manner that causes the public
to confuse the celebrity’s attributes with the attributes of the
artist or designer. Nevertheless, right of publicity law prohibits
uses of a celebrity’s persona that are self-serving and that
constitute unfair and unethical exploitation, providing the
connection with the ethical prohibition on plagiarism.96
The advice not to copy other people’s works under
copyright law extends to the use of a celebrity’s name, image, or
likeness under right of publicity law: if you want to remain
ethical and liability-free, do not use other people’s names,
images, or likenesses in your art. If you find yourself compelled
to use a celebrity name, image, or likeness, carefully follow the
advice and recommendations here that explain the difference
between expressive, creative uses that require the use of the
celebrity’s identifiable and recognizable attributes, and uses
that amount to crass exploitation of the star-power of the
celebrity.
The right of publicity is a right to control the use of one’s
name, image, likeness, or other valuable attributes of one’s
persona by others, when others seek to use these things for
personal gain or commercial advantage.97 The right of publicity
typically is classified as an intellectual property right98—“the
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial
use of his or her identity.”99 While there are many connections
and overlapping features of publicity rights and other
intellectual property rights (particularly copyright), there are
also differences, and artists and designers should alert
themselves to these differences.
In the case of copyright and the right of publicity, not all of
the requirements and public policies supporting the two rights
96. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra
note 65, at § 3.2.
98. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006)
(stating that the right of publicity is an intellectual property right); see also,
e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “intellectual
property” as including publicity rights); J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B.
Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1712
(1987) (“The right of publicity [has] matured into a distinctive legal category
occupying an important place in the law of intellectual property.”).
99. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003).
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of action are the same. Further, defenses that are effective
against one are not automatically effective against the other.
For example, originality and creativity are not requirements for
right of publicity protection100 (for which many pop stars and
celebrities of the moment should be grateful). Nevertheless,
publicity rights are extended to persons to control or bar uses
that exploit the value of their names, images, or likenesses in
ways that exactly parallel the rights of the owners of original,
copyrightable works.101 Copyright fair uses generally apply in
right of publicity actions, but not exactly in a one-to-one
correspondence that would allow for fairly simple legal
analyses and straight-forward predictions regarding one kind
of artistic use of a celebrity image compared to another.102
The right of publicity is complicated by a number of
historical anomalies that led to a messy establishment of a
right of action. One, the right was initially conceived of as a
right of privacy claim, focusing on use of a name, image or
likeness as being an intrusion into one’s personal sphere, with
resulting injuries to one’s person (e.g., feelings, reputation, or
standing in the community).103 Two, the right later morphed

100. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity
Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163–66, 1190 (2006)
(arguing that similar to trademark law, the right of publicity is not concerned
with the encouragement of new creation but protection of names and integrity
in commercial contexts); Dougherty, supra note 66, at 27–28 (concluding that
transformative works recognize separate value and creativity within the work,
and transformative works do not violate the right of publicity); Michael
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 134 (1993) (arguing that right of publicity is
about determining the meaning of images); Steven Semeraro, Property’s End:
Why Competition Policy Should Limit the Right of Publicity, 43 CONN. L. REV.
753, 775–81 (2011) (arguing that right of publicity assists celebrities with
maximizing profit).
101. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953) (advancing publicity law away from privacy law, and holding
publicity law protects the public value of a celebrity image); see also Marshall
Leaffer, The Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70 ALB. L. REV.
1357, 1360 (2007).
102. See infra Part III (describing fair uses in copyright and right of
publicity law).
103. ETW, 332 F.3d at 952–53; PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 65, §
1.11; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1167–71 (presenting a
comprehensive history of the right of privacy); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (arguing that
with the advancement in civilization, privacy requires a need for personal
protection).
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into a property right claim, protecting the commercial value of
a celebrity name, image, or likeness from unauthorized
exploitation of that monetary value.104 Three, the right has
never been tied to one set of public policy goals that would
allow for a more orderly evaluation of the rights of publicity
against other important rights, such as free speech and artistic
expression.105 This has an impact on the use of celebrity images
and likenesses: it is considered less “fair” to use an image if the
harm is characterized as a personal injury rather than simply a
harm to a pecuniary or property right. Torts (i.e., personal
injuries) usually are not excused simply because the actor had
a motive to communicate. On the other hand, expression of
news, social commentary, or education may be all that is
required to balance out a use as “fair” compared to a person’s
pecuniary interest in their name, image, or likeness.
There are four public policies that support the extension of
publicity rights: (1) direct reward to artists, performers,
entertainers, and athletes for achievement in their areas;106 (2)
indirect support to artists, performers, entertainers, and
athletes to encourage them to strive to excel so as to benefit the
public at large with better arts, literature, entertainment, and
sports (this being the exact public policy supporting the
extension of copyright and patent intellectual property
rights);107 (3) equitable considerations of fairness and
prevention of unjust enrichment and unfair competition (which
has more overlap with the policies supporting the trademark
laws which seek to avoid consumer confusion and unfair

104. ETW, 332 F.3d at 952–53; Haelan, 202 F.2d at 866; W. PAGE KEETON
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984);
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1170–73.
105. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 100, at 1172–73 (explaining that the
court did not tie its decision to specific policy justifications rather than to a
broader context).
106. Madow, supra note 100, at 205–17 (explaining various economic
incentives that directly benefit artists); see also Mark Bartholomew, A Right Is
Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 301,
310–14, 321–31 (2011) (arguing the importance of recognizing celebrity value).
107. Madow, supra note 100, at 206–09 (arguing that celebrities foster
their talent to benefit society as a whole); Bartholomew, supra note 106, at
321–31 (arguing that celebrity’s actions are for the public spotlight); see also
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 246–47 (2003) (arguing that “authors” under
copyright law are not the primary beneficiaries of the public benefits of the
law).
ET AL.,
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competition);108 and (4) outright theft of something valuable
and marketable that is referred to as good will, star power, or
simply publicity value.109 Again, the fact that there are four
policies makes the law complicated for attorneys, judges, and
legislators seeking to interpret, apply, or advance the law, as
well as for artists and designers seeking to walk a safe path
under the law, because the public policies do not always argue
in favor of the same extension of rights and the same defenses
against the rights. Artistic expression is regarded as a worthy
activity, but it carries less force when weighed in a
consideration of equity (the artist took for free what others
regularly pay for), rather than in a balancing of one public good
(encouragement of celebrities and athletes to improve their
craft and sport for the good of the public) against another (free,
uninhibited expression of the meaning, message, role, or
function of the celebrity or athlete in the modern world for the
good of the public). The analysis returns to the purpose of the
activity and whether, on balance, it appears to promote First
Amendment values, or whether it amounts to exploitation.
Exploitation in the right of publicity context, as in
plagiarism, requires an artist to use the celebrity’s name,
image, or likeness for some advantage. The public policies
behind right of publicity law have converged to require that the
advantage must be one that benefits the user in a manner that
does not directly serve First Amendment values of
commentary, criticism, news reporting, and education of public
affairs.110 In other words, the artist’s or designer’s purpose—

108. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 838 (6th
Cir. 1983); C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1090 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46
cmt.c (1995); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Property and Liability Rule Analysis,
70 IND. L.J. 47, 54–55 (1994).
109. See C.B.C. Distribution, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (arguing that dilution
of a person’s identity might occur).
110. H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identity: A
New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17 COLUM.-VLA. J.L. & ARTS 1, 15–16, 20–
23 (1992); Daniel E. Wanat, Entertainment Law: An Analysis of Judicial
Decision-Making in Cases Where a Celebrity’s Publicity Right Is in Conflict
with a User’s First Amendment Right, 67 ALB. L. REV. 251, 271–77 (2003); see
also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 955 (6th Cir. 2003)
(identifying the tension between the right of publicity and First Amendment
Rights); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803–08
(Cal. 2001).
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her predominant purpose111—in using the celebrity’s persona
must be self-serving in greater proportion than the service paid
in First Amendment activities that substantially benefit the
public.112 The need to accommodate First Amendment concerns
causes the courts to concentrate heavily on the artist’s
predominant purpose in using the celebrity name, image, or
likeness. To be sure, not every expressive use of a celebrity’s
persona is predominantly expressive in a way that benefits
First Amendment concerns more than the concerns over the
exploitation of the celebrity star power. Many expressive uses
are held to be predominantly self-serving and exploitative.
Newspapers, television broadcasters, bloggers, artists, or
designers want to be known for good works, increase their
following, increase sales of the newspaper or advertising
revenues on the blog or broadcast, or simply increase their own
stature in their community; however, the law accepts these
pecuniary advantages and focuses instead on the predominant
purpose of the activity and whether, on balance, the activity
fulfills First Amendment goals and public policies over any
collateral exploitation at work in the case.113
The advantage may be as obvious as trying to market or
advertise one’s own artworks using the celebrity’s name, image,
or likeness as an attention-getter or simply to suggest some
kind of approval (e.g., sponsorship, endorsement) by the
celebrity of the artist’s works. An unauthorized “advertising”
use would certainly run afoul of the publicity laws.114 But it
111. I use the term, “predominant purpose,” in part because the case law
gravitates to this term. See, e.g., ETW, 332 F.3d at 959; Winter v. DC Comics,
69 P.3d 473, 478 (Cal. 2003); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809; Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). The law recognizes
that multiple purposes for use of a name, image, or likeness most often are at
play in the activity.
112. ETW, 332 F.3d at 955–59; Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968–72 (10th Cir. 1996); Winter, 69 P.3d at 478;
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 806–09; Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 370–74.
113. Compare ETW, 332 F.3d at 959 (arguing for a predominantly
expressive purpose in a painting and serigraph series that depicted several
scenes from Tiger Woods’ historic first winning of the Masters major golf
tournament), with Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569–
78 (1977) (demonstrating the power of the right of publicity when the Court
failed to uphold the First Amendment rights of a television news broadcaster
that aired the public interest news information about a county fair performer
and exploited the performer’s human cannonball act); see also Winter, 69 P.3d
at 478; Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809; Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
114. See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 909–1005 (9th Cir.
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could be a use of the celebrity’s name, image, or likeness simply
to improve the quality, content, and value of the works
themselves, as in the case where an artist’s paintings of generic
golfers do not sell, but the artist’s paintings of an instantly
recognizable Tiger Woods sell like hotcakes. Even though
expressive use of the image has First Amendment value, the
use might be viewed as an unfair advantage taken by the artist
that amounts to a violation of Woods’ right of publicity.115 The
advantage to the artist need not be large. If the artist has a
purpose and intention in mind that obviously exceeds mere
exploitation of the celebrity’s star power, the use of the
celebrity’s name, image, or likeness may be approved as a “fair
use” as discussed in the next Part.
III. MODIFY IT OBVIOUSLY—THE ETHICS OF
TRANSFORMATION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS OR
CELEBRITY IMAGES OR LIKENESS
The doctrine of fair use in copyright law was created and
developed to further the same goals as the constitutional
protection of copyrights and patents: “To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts,”116 as well as to protect the
constitutional First Amendment goals of open and robust free
expression.117 Fair use is one of the main reasons why the
Supreme Court holds that the copyright monopoly on
replication of copyrighted works does not violate the First
Amendment’s
limits
on
content-based
restraints
of
expression.118 The value of writings and creations to the
2010); Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009);
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996);
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988); Bosley v.
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Doe, 110 S.W.3d at
373–74.
115. But see ETW, 332 F.3d at 959 (arguing that the artist balanced the
expressive purpose over the exploitative purpose in the depiction of scenes
from Tiger Woods’ historic first winning of the Masters major golf
tournament).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing against repression of
speech); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for the free trade of ideas).
118. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 246–47 (2003); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547–50 (1985).
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progress of science and the arts is that they are new—not
copied—and therefore, “original.” The creation and
promulgation of new expression also is a core objective of the
First Amendment.119 Thus, the ethical use and treatment of
existing works is intended to further the creation of new, alloriginal content or obviously modified content. “Obviously
modified content” is new expression, not the same as the
original. And like the copyright originality standard itself,
modification and transformation do not require uniqueness or
one-of-a-kind status, but they do require new expression.
Fair use always has involved the examination of the user’s
motive: Was it to steal or to create? Was it to avoid the
drudgery of thinking up original works, or was it to build on
works through obvious transformation so as to create
“something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message”?120 A more succinct question is, was the motive to be
expressive or exploitative? Thus, the concepts of transformation
and predominant purpose dominate the discussion of copyright
fair use.121
Right of publicity fair uses also are drawn directly from
First Amendment freedom of expression principles.122 The
recognized defenses are: comment and criticism, artistic
expression, news reporting of newsworthy events, and
advertising and promotion of the speaker’s activities relating to
one of the above uses.123

119. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–91 (2012); United States v.
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584–86 (2010).
120. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
121. See What is Transformative?, supra note 39, at 1–3 (discussing the
convergence of transformation and predominant purpose within copyright
law).
122. See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 909–10 (9th Cir.
2010) (discussing the use of the transformative test and public interest
defense, both grounded in First Amendment principles); C.B.C. Distribution &
Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 819
(8th Cir. 2007); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809
(Cal. 2001) (discussing the application of First Amendment to the publicity
context of baseball cards).
123. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c
(1995); DUBOFF, MURRAY, & KING, DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, supra note 77, at
Bk. S; DUBOFF, BURR, & MURRAY, ART LAW, supra note 77, at ch. 5; see also
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 935–36 (6th Cir. 2003)
(defending works of artistic expression); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473,
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In spite of its different origins in the law, right of publicity
law recognizes the two steps of transformation and
predominant purpose directly in its fair use analyses. The
transformative requirement is met by the alteration of the
content, meaning, and expression—in short, the value—of the
image, likeness, or name of the celebrity used in the second
work.124 A work that copies or allows the celebrity publicity
value of the image, likeness, or name (the same meaning, same
expression, same purpose, for the same audience) to shine
through in the artist’s work will not be deemed to be fair.125
Another, less-strictly-defined path to the same determination is
to consider whether the second work’s predominant purpose is
to exploit the celebrity publicity value of the name, image, or
likeness, or whether it has a predominantly expressive purpose
adding new, expressive value to the original name, image, or
likeness.126
A. TRANSFORMATION WITH A PREDOMINANT FIRST AMENDMENT
EXPRESSIVE PURPOSE IN COPYRIGHT FAIR USE LAW
I have written elsewhere about the convergence of
transformation and predominant purpose analysis in copyright
fair use law.127 Campbell established that “transformation”
requires a change in the purpose and character of the work.128
It is evident from the record of cases that the courts take the
“purpose” part of that interpretive rule very seriously, for all of
the approved fair uses in the appellate cases involved a change
in the predominant purpose for the use of the work rather than
simply a change in the character (the form, the contents) of the

478 (Cal. 2003); Matthew D. Bunker, Free Speech Meets the Publicity Tort:
Transformative Use Analysis in Right of Publicity Law, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y
301, 304–20 (2008); Garon, supra note 41, at 485–92; Andrew Koo, Right of
Publicity: The Right of Publicity Fair Use Doctrine—Adopting a Better
Standard, 4 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 18–23 (2007).
124. See, e.g., Hilton, 599 F.3d at 909–10; Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 740
F. Supp. 2d 658, 665 (D.N.J. 2010); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F.
Supp. 2d 758, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (discussing the distinctiveness of products
and potential confusion by consumers).
125. Hilton, 599 F.3d at 909–10; Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 800.
126. ETW, 332 F.3d at 959; Winter, 69 P.3d at 478; Comedy III, 21 P.3d at
809; Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
127. What is Transformative?, supra note 39, at 1–3.
128. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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work.129
There are three successful pathways to fair use in
copyright law:
• Transformation of content of the work with a
change in the predominant purpose of the work130
• Transformation of the context of the work with a
change in the predominant purpose of the work131
• A significant change in the predominant purpose
and function of the work even without a change in
the content or context of the work.132
The strongest transformative fair uses are those that
modify the contents, function, and purpose of the original work
in a significant and obvious manner, by turning the meaning of
the work on its head, or by openly criticizing the original
work.133 Ideally, the expression of the contents of the original
work is altered134 or overwhelmed by the addition of significant
creative expression135 so that the predominant purpose of the
new work is significantly different from that of the original
work.136 This is the most secure path to fair treatment of other
artists’ works, which is why the recommendation of this Article

129. What is Transformative?, supra note 39, at 5; see also Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
Google’s use of thumbnails in search engines is highly transformative); Blanch
v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 248–50 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that transformative use
requires more than finding a new way to exploit the original work); Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001).
130. See generally What is Transformative?, supra note 39, at 274–95.
131. Id.
132. Id. In this recent work, I examine all of the United States Supreme
Court and United States Court of Appeals cases applying the transformative
test to evaluate copyright fair use claims in every type of copyrightable media.
In the instant article, I focus my discussion on the data set of cases
synthesized in the prior article that involve artistic works and cases involving
certain fair use defenses, such as parody, that are well-suited for application
in art and design situations.
133. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (stressing the importance of altering the
purpose of images); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251–53; Mattel Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800–02 (9th Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank, 268
F.3d at 1269.
134. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1257, 1269;
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pics. Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
135. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251; Mattel, 353 F.3d at 800–02.
136. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146, 1164 (9th Cir. 2007); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251; Suntrust Bank, 268
F.3d at 1269.
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is that if artists or designers intend to incorporate material
from preexisting works into their own works, they should
modify the material in an obvious manner.
The use of an artistic original work will be deemed
transformative when the use adds valuable artistic changes to
the original giving the resulting work new meaning and artistic
expression.137 The artistic changes must create a new meaning
and new expression; if the original simply is redisplayed,
reproduced, rebroadcast, or redistributed in a new mode or
method of exploiting the same creative artistic virtues of the
original work, the use will be deemed not to be transformative,
and not to be a fair use.138 This point is significant for artists
137. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–80 (discussing how the rap group
added new musical style and genre and new lyrics to original rock ballad
creating a new musical composition with a new, cynical, streetwise meaning);
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244 (examining how artist Jeffrey Koons placed Blanch’s
original fashion magazine photographic image into painting combining image
with additional “images of confections” and Niagra Falls to make a new
expression commenting on the appetites of modern society); Leibovitz, 137
F.3d at 109 (examining how a movie poster changed original Leibovitz
photograph from a work of serious art with a historical Renaissance art
reference to one with a new parodic meaning).
138. Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295, 307 (3d Cir.
2011) (concluding the slightly cropped photo of radio “shock jocks” used for the
same news and promotional purposes as the original photo was not
transformative, and therefore not fair use); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd., 619
F.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff Bouchat’s Shield Drawing was adapted
for the Raven’s “Flying B” logo on helmets and uniforms, on the playing field,
and in posters, tickets, and advertising, but all such uses as a logo still
revealed and reproduced the same valuable artistic expression as the original
Shield Drawing, and the product of the changes and adaptations still carried
the same meaning and message as the original); Gaylord v. United States, 595
F.3d 1364, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding the photograph and postage
stamp depicting plaintiff’s Korean War Memorial each adapted and altered
the appearance of the war memorial to display a different tone and mood in
the depiction, but the ultimate meaning and message of the original memorial
and these artistic adaptations was held to be the same: to remember and
celebrate Korean War Veterans; thus, the uses were not fair); Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 2009)
(affirming that although defendant’s sampling placed the iconic Atomic Dog
funk lyric and funk track in an updated hip-hop recording, the most
recognizable elements of the funk track were reproduced with little variation
or alteration from the original; thus, the track was reused for the same
musical artistic purposes as the original, and the hip-hop version of the
sample carried the same meaning and expression as the original; therefore,
the use was not fair); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d
132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (changing the format and medium of entertainment
material from the Seinfeld television series to a trivia quiz format did not add
new and valuable artistic or entertainment content to the original material,
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and designers because it often is the case that artists and
designers will seek to incorporate preexisting works into their
works precisely to show off the valuable aesthetic attributes of
the preexisting work. Artists want to recast the works in a new
setting, but allow the original art and imagery to shine through
in their new work; musicians want to take an attractive piece of
an earlier recording and loop it continuously to show off its
attractive elements. The motivation to reproduce attractive
works to benefit the quality and attractiveness of the artist’s
own works is understandable, but the cases confirm that this
kind of plagiaristic exploitation is unfair and unacceptable.
Works that are not changed in form139 may be transformed
in predominant purpose by recontextualization of the copied
material.140 In successful cases, the new context contains
additional expression that overwhelms the initial expression
and prevents the original material from shining through in the
new work for the same purposes for which the original work
was created.141 A change in context for an artistic work even
without any changes to the content of the work may be

and did not change the meaning, message, expression, or purpose of the
original material; thus, the use of the original entertainment content was not
fair).
139. I have evaluated changes in form to mean more than a change in size
or reorientation of the material on a new axis. Certain cases involved a change
in size of the works from full-scale to thumbnail size. See, e.g., Perfect 10, 508
F.3d at 1164; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605,
613 (2d Cir. 2006). Others took preexisting works and reoriented them on the
axis of the work from diagonal to straight vertical. See e.g., Blanch, 467 F.3d
at 247–49. Nothing in the law or cases indicates that this alteration alone is
meaningful to a fair use analysis. However, as discussed previously, in each of
these cases, the recontextualization of the material along with a change in the
predominant purpose and functioning of the material was significant in
making a successful determination of fair use in each case.
140. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 248 (stating that artist Jeffrey Koons changed
the function and purpose of Blanch’s fashion photograph by recontextualizing
it with a large array of images of “confections”); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 802–03
(explaining that the artist changed the function and purpose of a depiction of
Barbie by recontextualizing the image into scenes with kitchen appliances).
141. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 248 (explaining that the plaintiff’s photography
was only one part of the imagery of women’s legs shown, and whose expression
was further changed by its juxtaposition with images of “confections” in Koons’
work); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 802–03 (arguing that the artist changed the
function and purpose of a depiction of Barbie by recontextualizing the image
into scenes of seemingly dangerous kitchen appliances, thus changing the
meaning and purpose from a depiction of the “ideal American woman” to an
image of a frazzled or oblivious female in peril).
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sufficient if the predominant purpose and functioning of the
new work is sufficiently different from the original work and
fulfills one of the principle goals of the copyright laws.142 A
change in context alone for artistic works is not necessarily
sufficient if the change does not have a new purpose and
function that communicates a new meaning with new, valuable
expression, furthering a goal of the copyright laws.143
142. See Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 319–20 (explaining that the use of original
Shield Drawing in logos held and displayed for historical and archival reasons
at the Baltimore Ravens’ headquarters was a use with a purpose and function
different from the artistic purpose and meaning of the original work, and
therefore holding that historical, referential, and archival uses are appropriate
fair use purposes); Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1146, 1165 (holding that although
the original photographs were reduced in size to thumbnail images but
otherwise reproduced verbatim, the purpose and function of the thumbnails
within an internet search engine’s “image search” results screen was a
completely new function with a new and different purpose and meaning from
the artistic purposes and meaning of the original photographs; the use fulfilled
proper fair use reference and research purposes); see also Bill Graham
Archives, 448 F.3d at 609–10 (holding that while the original images of concert
posters were reduced in size but otherwise reproduced verbatim, the purpose
and function of the new use of the images—to document a timeline of concert
performances of the Grateful Dead—was completely new and different from
the artistic purposes and meaning of the original poster images and fulfilled
proper fair use archival, historical, referential, and educational purposes);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the
use of original images in reduced size for purposes of displaying search results
in internet image search engine was a new function with a new purpose and
meaning); Núnez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir.
2000) (concluding that the republication of original modeling portfolio
photographs without alteration but within new context of news reporting of
the actual existence of the photographs themselves after subject became
Puerto Rico’s Miss Universe contestant was a new function with a new
meaning and new purpose for the photographs that met fair use news and
reference purposes); Sony Computer Ent. America, Inc. v. Bleem, L.L.C., 214
F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000) (using screen shots from original computer game in
comparative advertising to critique the original images was fair use).
143. Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 309 (concluding that aside from historical and
archival uses at Baltimore Ravens’ headquarters, the general use of the
plaintiff’s Shield Drawing in stadium advertising, on the field, on uniforms, on
tickets and other merchandise did not represent a new appropriate function
for the drawing and did not fulfill a different artistic or creative purpose for
the original work, and thus, did not constitute a fair use); Gaylord, 595 F.3d at
1372–73 (determining that the function and meaning of the original sculpture
and the images in the photograph and postage stamp were held to be the
same: to celebrate and remember Korean War Veterans); Leadsinger, Inc. v.
BMG Music Publ’g,, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that change
in form and function from audio recording to karaoke soundtrack audio
recording was not a new function carrying new meaning or purpose from
original musical recordings); see also Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama
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Parody is an excellent fair use because it uses the original
work in order to ridicule the original work; the second user
turns the function and purpose of the original work on its head,
and in fact employs the expression of the original material in
an effort to undermine the purposes and objectives of the
original work.144 Satirical uses (i.e., uses for comment and
Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 582–83 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the
change from an audio recording to a karaoke soundtrack audio recording was
not a new function carrying new meaning or purpose from original musical
recordings); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 628–
29 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that video and audio segments from performances
of Elvis were recombined into a new context—a comprehensive video
biography work—but were reproduced for the same purpose and carried the
same function and meaning as the original video and audio recordings); Video
Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198–200 (3d
Cir. 2003) (copying two-minute segments of original motion pictures for use as
internal reference for proprietary video database did not create a new function
carrying a new appropriate fair use meaning and purpose different from the
original artistic works); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175–76 (2d
Cir. 2001) (depicting the original artwork in a print ad was simply a new
context for the work without any change in artistic purpose and function of the
original work); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th
Cir. 2001) (facilitating a change in format from CD to MP3 format and
changing context of recording to facilitate unlicensed uncompensated file
transfer did not create a new function carrying a new appropriate fair use
meaning and purpose different from the original artistic works); Infinity
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108–09 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding
that the change in mode and medium of communication from radio broadcast
to telephone communication did not create a new function carrying a new
appropriate fair use meaning and purpose different from the original artistic
works); Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997)
(concluding reproduction of a story quilt image from an authorized museum
poster to an unauthorized use as set dressing on television program did not
create a new function carrying a new appropriate fair use meaning and
purpose different from the original artistic work).
144. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579–84
(1994) (concluding that 2 Live Crew copied the bass riff and musical scheme of
the beginning of “Pretty Woman” and proceeded to distort the music and lyrics
to make a rap song that ridiculed the romantic tone and naïveté of the original
rock ballad), Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1272–74,
1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing that “Wind Done Gone” copied characters
and situations from “Gone With the Wind” but distorted the dialogue and
point of view of the work by adding a new tone and new meaning to the “race
relations of the place and era” of the original), Mattel, 353 F.3d at 802–03
(discussing that the artist placed Barbie dolls in unusual settings with kitchen
appliances to comment on and criticize Barbie’s iconic status as a role model
for young American girls), and Leibovitz v. Paramount Pics. Corp., 137 F.3d
109, 114–115 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing that Paramount created the poster
with famous portrait of a pregnant star and distorted the image by
superimposing a male comedian’s head onto the female star’s body as a
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criticism where the object of the criticism is not the original
work or the original author), may be accepted as fair use, but
the new work must be highly transformed and must not exploit
the same creative artistic virtues of the original for the same or
similar purposes as the original.145 All of the changes in
function and purpose by the authors of successful parodies and
satires created a new work or a new situation of employment of
the original work that furthered important First Amendment
public policy goals of comment and criticism, education, or
research (both as to current and historical events). The second
users also produced a new work or new employment of the old
work in a manner that had little competitive impact on the
original work’s owners’ ability to continue to exploit the
original functions and purposes of the original work,146
comment to the pretentious artistic styling of the original), with Salinger v.
Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing Colting’s attempt to
advance the plot of “Catcher in the Rye” by sixty years and addition of
Salinger as a character in Salinger’s own story to comment on and critique the
original work, the main character, and Salinger’s reclusive lifestyle, but in the
end, finding the new work merely exploited the same creative aspects of the
original novel in the manner of a derivative work, not a parody or other proper
commentary or criticism), and Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,
109 F.3d 1394, 1400–05 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that although O.J. Simpson
trial story changed the entire genre, theme, tone, characters, dialogue, and
plot of the original “Cat in the Hat” work, the court found no critical
commentary or statement of any kind regarding or reflecting on the original
Dr. Seuss work, and the court concluded that the second work merely stole
and exploited the Dr. Seuss work to grab attention).
145. Compare Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244, 248 (finding that Blanch’s work was
used as one example of the genre of fashion imagery, and the additional
creative, artistic material added by Koons and his recontextualization of the
work overwhelmed any exploitive purpose in the use of the creative content
reflected in Blanch’s original photograph), with Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73
(explaining that the additional commentary and message added by Colting to
the message of Catcher in the Rye did not change the fact that his work
generally exploited the creative material of the original work by advancing the
plot, rather than changing the function and purpose of the work), and Castle
Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the Seinfeld Aptitude Test did not make commentary or
criticism regarding the Seinfeld series, but still exploited the same creative
value and meaning of the original for the same entertainment purpose as the
original), and Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1400–01 (explaining that the
author’s “Cat Not in the Hat” commentary and criticism of the O.J. Simpson
trial and the U.S. court system did not justify the exploitation of the creative
artwork and rhyming style of the original Dr. Seuss work).
146. In basic terms, a new work with a completely changed message and
purpose is unlikely to satisfy the fans and consumers of the original work;
thus, the new work does not “supersede the objects” of the original work. E.g.,
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supporting the argument that the second users’ uses were fair.
The advice of this Article is not to use other’s works or to
modify them obviously. In cases of non-transformation, neither
the contents nor the function and purpose of the original work
is changed, no greater First Amendment public policy purpose
is furthered beyond that served by the creation and publication
of the original work, and the original work is therefore
exploited for exactly the same purposes for which it was
originally created. It is easy to see that these cases of selfserving exploitation are not held to be fair.147
Secondary users of artistic works might find it difficult to
reconcile the several fair use cases where secondary users
appear to have greatly altered significant aspects of the
original works, but their uses were not found to be fair. These
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244, 258 (finding that Koon’s recontextualized use of legs
from Blanch’s photograph had no deleterious effect upon Blanch’s
photograph’s market value); Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 116–17 (“[T]he Paramount
photograph did not interfere with any potential market for [Leibovitz’s]
photograph or for derivative works based upon it.”); see also Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342, 348–49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J., sitting as circuit justice)
(stating that fair use works do not “supersede the objects” of the original work
but that exact copying of original works is not allowed); Campbell, 510 U.S. at
579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9. F. Cas. at 348).
147. See Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295, 307 (3d
Cir. 2011) (holding no fair use when photos of radio personalities were only
slightly cropped to remove original photographer’s copyright notice, and
otherwise used without permission for the same news and promotional
purposes as the original); Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 309 (holding no fair use when a
non-altered drawing that formed the basis of the team’s logo was used in
dozens of items associated with the team); Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 530
(holding that the non-alteration of basic elements of music when adapted for
karaoke lead to a finding of no fair use); see also Zomba Enterprises, 491 F.3d
at 582–83 (holding that the non-alteration of basic elements of music when
adapted for karaoke lead to a finding of no fair use); Elvis Presley Enters., 349
F.3d at 628–29 (finding no fair use when the original video clips and
recordings were not altered or modified in content when compiled for
biographical video compilation); Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 198–200 (finding
no fair use when the film contents were excerpted without other alteration for
use in proprietary video database); A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1015 (holding
that there is no fair use when the content and expression of the original audio
recordings were not altered or modified when the works were changed in
digital format and compiled to assist file-sharing); Infinity Broad. Co., 150
F.3d at 108–09 (finding no fair use when the only change in the work was a
change in mode and medium of communication from radio broadcast to
telephone communication); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 70 (finding that the
appearance of a story quilt poster was not altered or modified, but that only
the amount shown or the timing of each display varied in the non-fair use
display of the work).
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seemingly incongruous outcomes are addressed by explanatory
synthesis when all of these cases are considered together to
explain the common underpinning and public policy objectives
pursued by the courts in these opinions: even significant
alteration of the form, or genre, or theme, or tone, or even the
overall meaning of the works will not be found to be fair uses if
non-trivial portions of the creative, artistic, and expressive
virtues of the original works shine through and are not
replaced or overwhelmed by the expression in the second
work.148 Aside from specific critical fair uses such as parody
that rely on the exposition of certain key attributes of the
original work in the second work, in other contexts, if the
creative, artistic, and expressive virtues of the original works
still are discernible in the second work, and still add value to
the second work, the use of the original work will be deemed
unfair.149

148. Compare Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1372–73 (holding that there is no fair
use when the appearance of the Korean War Memorial was significantly
altered in the photograph and postage stamp but still depicted the same
artistic design and expression of the original sculpture; the artistic
embellishments of the photograph and stamp did not change the meaning and
function of the original work), Bridgeport Music v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585
F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that hip hop group’s sampling of the
iconic Atomic Dog sound and lyric significantly altered the genre and context
of the original, but allowed the iconic sound and expression of the original
work to shine through, with that being the primary purpose of the inclusion of
the same in the second work, and this improperly exploited the creative,
artistic virtues of the original work), Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142 (finding that
the Seinfeld trivia book significantly altered the form and presentation of the
original television show content, but the transformation did not change the
entertainment function and purpose of the original work and allowed the
creative, entertaining content and expression of the original material to shine
through in the second work), and Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1400–07
(holding that the original artwork, graphic design, and poetic style of the
original Dr. Seuss work was allowed to shine through in the second work
although the style, genre, tone, and function of the plot and story of the second
work was completely different from the original), with Blanch, 467 F.3d at 245
(finding the original work was used as raw material—a placeholder for a
certain genre of fashion photographic depiction of women—and the artistic
changes added by Koons were meant to completely change the meaning and
message of the depiction for a new function and purpose), and Leibovitz, 137
F.3d at 109, 110-11 (finding the original photograph was altered specifically to
change the meaning, function, and purpose of the original from a serious
artistic portrait to a parody of the original work).
149. E.g., Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73; Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1372–73;
Bridgeport Music, 585 F.3d at 278; Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142; Dr. Seuss
Enters., 109 F.3d at 1407.
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B. TRANSFORMATION WITH A PREDOMINANT FIRST AMENDMENT
EXPRESSIVE PURPOSE IN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY FAIR USE LAW
The good news for those who seek to follow the ethical, fair
use path with regard to celebrity images and likenesses is that
DIOS MIO governs the path equally well with regard to
publicity rights as it does with copyright: do not use celebrities’
names, images, and likenesses in your art and design works, or
modify the images and likenesses in an obvious manner. Highly
transformative uses that overwhelm the original celebrity
image with new content and expression will be considered
fair.150 Of these uses, parodies again appear to have the most
potential for success because the second user is replicating the
name, image, or likeness of the celebrity specifically for the
purpose of making fun of the celebrity, fulfilling a valid First
Amendment purpose of comment and criticism that requires
the use of identifying information and imagery in order to
reveal the subject of the criticism.151 Cases confirm that the use
of names and images specifically to ridicule the celebrities is a
fairly safe way to incorporate these names or images into

150. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477–80 (Cal. 2003) (finding
that DC Comics featured a highly transformed image of the Winter Brothers
singing duo—the two were depicted as giant albino worms rather than human
singing celebrities in a general effort to denigrate the two singers); World
Wrestling Fed. Enter. Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417–
424, 428 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (discussing how Big Dog T-shirt manufacturer used
“dogified”—canine-morphed—images of pro-wrestlers such that the wrestlers
were depicted as dogs with dog-like names and attributes, e.g., World
Wrestling star, Stone Cold Steve Austin, was referred to as “Bone Cold Steve
Pawstin” in Big Dog’s works, in as a parody of the pro-wrestlers); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962–73 (10th Cir.
1996) (discussing how the Cardtoons makers criticized baseball players’ egos,
exorbitant salaries, and other excesses of their personalities through the
device of artistic, but highly critical baseball cards that showed a transformed
cartoon version of the ball player along with fake “stats” about the excesses or
ego of the player).
151. See Winter, 69 P.3d at 477–80 (concluding the Winter Brothers were
depicted in order to reveal the comic artist’s dislike of the singing duo; the
artist did not recreate their image for any exploitative purpose other than to
reveal the target of the criticism); World Wrestling, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 428
(concluding that the Big Dog T-shirt manufacturer attempted to identify the
targets of their spoofing with morphed images and names to suggest the
“dogified” nature of the parody); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 962–63, 968–72
(discussing how the Cardtoons makers rendered the images of players in
cartoon form, and morphed their names to reveal the targets of the criticism,
e.g., Barry Bonds was renamed “Treasury Bonds” as part of the criticism that
he was overpaid and overly egotistical).
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artworks and designs.
Non-critical, non-parodic artistic expression of a celebrity
image or likeness is a dangerous undertaking. A few courts
interpreting New York law have gone on record as taking an
expansive view toward allowing the depiction of a celebrity in
works of art simply to display the celebrity in art.152 California
courts have made the opposite record: a simple, artistic
depiction of a celebrity for commercial sale of the artwork
constitutes exploitation that violates the celebrity’s publicity
rights.153
Significant artistic transformation of the celebrity image
improves the equation in favor of fair use.154 The fame of the
artist and her notoriety for this kind of artistic transformation
also will improve the odds that the fair use equation will work
out in favor of the artist.155 In Comedy III, the court evaluated

152. See Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1018 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1993)
(explaining a ruling that artists may create a limited number of art works
depicting a celebrity image without liability under New York’s publicity law);
see also Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 349–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that defendant artist Barbara Kruger’s use of a photographic image of
a female model from the 1960’s should be upheld against the model’s right of
publicity claim; following Simeonov, the court’s holding was that Kruger’s
depiction involved significant artistic recontextualization and added new
expression to the original image, making Kruger’s use fair).
153. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 909–11 (9th Cir. 2010)
(concluding card company violated Paris Hilton’s right of publicity when it
created a cartoon of the celebrity repeating her famous “That’s hot” line for a
greeting card); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797,
806–09, 811 (Cal. 2001) (finding the artist violated the Three Stooges’ rights of
publicity when the artist created a realistic depiction of the Stooges in
charcoal art reproduced for sale on lithographs and T-shirts).
154. Compare Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 342, 349–54 (holding that the
artist’s recontextualization contains “sufficiently transformative elements,”
which consisted of cropping and enlarging the photograph as well as
superimposing large red blocks that contained textual message), Winter, 69
P.3d at 478 (holding that transforming singers into albino worms was highly
transformative), and Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 609, 616
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (transforming an image of former disco star, Kirby—Lady
Miss Kier—into an animated avatar, and transforming a refrain from one of
the star’s songs, “Ooh la la,” into the name of the avatar, “Ulala” is fair use),
with Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811 (arguing that a defendant’s artistic rendering
in charcoal did not sufficiently transform the conventional image of the Three
Stooges to succeed against Stooges’ publicity claim).
155. See Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 342, 349–50 (stating that the artistdefendant, Barbara Kruger, is a “well-known artist, specializing in collage
works combining photographs and text”; her cropping and enlargement of the
1960’s photograph as well as superimposing large red blocks that contained
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the fame, artistic reputation, eye-catching technique, and starpower of Andy Warhol, holding that the artist overwhelmed the
value of the celebrities’ images that shown through in the
artist’s works.156 Gary Saderup, the artist-defendant in Comedy
III, might have had a following for his realistic depictions of
celebrities, but they were not presented in the context of some
greater ironic statement or commentary about the meaning or
message of the “stars” of his works. Saderup’s works were
simple, faithful, realistic, artistic depictions of the celebrities,
and as such, were held to violate the publicity rights of the
celebrities.157
The lesson for lawful, ethical treatment of celebrities’
names, images, and likenesses is that depiction of a celebrity to
communicate the meaning or message or the actual attributes
of the celebrity herself, absent any commentary on or criticism
of the meaning and message or symbolism of the celebrity or
her actions, is very likely to be found to be an unethical and
unlawful exploitation of the celebrity’s publicity rights. If you
modify the celebrity image’s appearance with a highly stylized,
recognizable method or technique that is original to you and
readily attributable to you (i.e., Modify It Obviously), then you
greatly improve your chances of success in a right of publicity
claim. You may not have to be as famous as Warhol or even
Barbara Kruger, but the degree to which observers will say,
“That is a great picture by [your name],” rather than, “That is a
great picture of [celebrity’s name],” is a measure of the
potential success you should expect if you choose to depict
celebrity images in your art.
Commentary and criticism and artistic transformation are
not the only First Amendment expressive purposes that might
be served by the use of a celebrity name, image, or likeness.
There is a general exception to liability for the reporting of
genuine newsworthy information about matters of public

textual message was held to be a fair use because of its artistic transformation
and new expression added to the image); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811 (stating
that Andy Warhol is a model for an artist whose works were valuable because
they were obviously his own through “distortion and careful manipulation of
context,” and not because they depicted Elvis, Marilyn Monroe, or Elizabeth
Taylor).
156. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811.
157. See id.
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interest.158 This has been extended to the depiction of
celebrities and celebrity sports figures in the context of
providing news and public affairs information about the sports
they play,159 and commentary about the meaning and
importance of the athlete’s achievements.160 The public interest
and public affairs exception even has been extended to protect
dissemination of information regarding current fashion trends
in apparel.161
It should be noted that news informational uses must be
genuine; one cannot simply celebrate the celebrity of the
moment by recreating their image and likeness in a work and
claiming that the use is intended for spreading news and public
interest information about the celebrity.162 Persons enjoying
158. Clay Calvert, Every Picture Tells a Story, Don’t It? Wrestling With the
Complex Relationship Among Photographs, Words and Newsworthiness in
Journalistic Storytelling, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 349, 353–58 (2010); Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35, 53–59 (1998); see also DUBOFF, MURRAY &
KING, DESKBOOK OF ART LAW, supra note 77, at Bk. S.
159. See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
use of major league baseball players’ names, stats, and likenesses in fantasy
baseball game is protected by the newsworthiness and public affairs
exception); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that an artistic depiction of Tiger Woods during his first victory at the
Masters was fair use); Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665
(D.N.J. 2010) (holding that use of collegiate football player’s avatar in football
simulation video game was not a violation of publicity rights).
160. See ETW, 332 F.3d at 931, 936 (finding that the artist’s depiction of
Tiger Woods’ during Woods’ historic win at the Masters was permitted in part
because of public interest in newsworthy athletes and sporting events).
161. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (9th
Cir. 2001) (finding that the movie star’s image shown in photograph while
playing a famous movie role was allowed to be modified for use in an article
presenting “a combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and
verbal editorial comment on classic films and famous actors” that fell under
the public affairs exception).
162. Compare Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 910–11 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that Hallmark Cards could not depict the socialite and
sometime reality TV star, Paris Hilton, in a greeting card cartoon that played
off of Hilton’s reality TV role as a waitress and her general notoriety; the use
was found to be unfair), and Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452–58
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding that OutKast hip hop group’s use of Rosa Park’s name,
although intended to be “‘metaphorical’ or ‘symbolic,’” was not about Rosa
Parks in biographical sense, and it “unquestionably enhanced the song’s
potential sale to the consuming public,” which raised the genuine issue of
material fact whether this use was unfair), with ETW, 332 F.3d at 931, 936
(holding that the “Wood’s victory in the 1997 tournament was a historic event
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the news and information services exception do not necessarily
have to be full-time members of the press,163 but they must be
involved in a concerted effort to disseminate news and
information, not simply producing a one-off depiction of a
celebrity in an artwork or design.
Celebrities lead newsworthy lives—it is a coincidence of
factors relating to a person’s public interest and news potential
that leads to the person being identified as a celebrity—but not
every use of a name, image, or likeness of a celebrity can be
justified as news or public interest in public affairs expressive
activity. Advertising and promotional uses of celebrities’
names, images, or likenesses in the sale of goods or other
commercial activities are the classic instances of violations of
the celebrities’ rights of publicity, even if the particular image
or footage used has or had, at least at some point, news and
public interest value.164

in the world of sports” and that “[a] piece of art that portrays a historic
sporting event communicates and celebrates the value our culture attaches to
such events” was found to be fair).
163. See ETW, 332 F.3d at 918–19 (noting the artist was a sports artist, not
a newsperson, and did not publish his painting and serigraphs in any news
outlet).
164. See Hilton, 599 F.3d at 909–11 (determining the socialite and
sometime reality TV star, Paris Hilton, became the subject of a Hallmark
greeting card that featured an artistic, cartoon rendition of Hilton playing off
of Hilton’s tag line, “That’s hot,” and her reality TV role as a waitress);
Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’gGrp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding
Hustler Magazine was not permitted to feature twenty-year-old nude and
partially nude photographs of one-time wrestler, Nancy Benoit, in a 2008 issue
of the magazine following Benoit’s murder in 2007; neither the
newsworthiness of the murder, nor the past-fame or notoriety of Benoit
provided a justification for exploitation of twenty-year-old images of Benoit for
purposes of promoting the current, 2008 sales of the magazine); Bosley v.
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925–29 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (concluding adult
video makers were not permitted to display wet t-shirt images of news
anchorwoman in the context of promoting the sale of adult video products);
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir.1996)
(remanding the case to trial based on sufficient facts shown by Abdul-Jabbar
that General Motors’s advertisement for Oldsmobile automobiles during the
NCAA basketball tournament with footage of Abdul-Jabbar playing college
basketball was exploitative and not a fair use; the newsworthiness of AbdulJabbar’s basketball record did not succeed in overcoming the fact that the
images were predominantly used to draw attention to General Motors’ attempt
to sell automobiles); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir.
1988) (remanding the case to trial based on sufficient showing that Ford Motor
Company’s ad mimicking the singing voice of Bette Midler in order to
advertise and sell Ford automobiles may not be a fair use).
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In Zacchini, the only right of publicity case adjudicated by
the United States Supreme Court, the high court held that the
unauthorized broadcast of the entire fifteen second
performance of a “human cannonball” act (Mr. Zacchini being
the aforementioned cannonball) at a county fair, aired in the
context of a regular nightly news broadcast in a segment
devoted to local human interest stories, still violated Zacchini’s
right of publicity because it was unfair and exploitative to air
for free the entire act of a performer who earns his livelihood
from these fifteen second performances.165 The First
Amendment rights of a member of the press timely engaged in
reporting a bona fide news story were overcome by the rights of
the celebrity not to have his livelihood threatened by this
usurpation of his publicity rights. This case should send a clear
message to artists and designers to play fairly with celebrity
images and likenesses, because fair and ethical handling of
publicity rights is a significant concern of the courts that will,
in proper circumstances, outweigh even a powerful First
Amendment expressive justification for the use of the celebrity
name, image, or likeness.
IV. CONCLUSION
The good news for the ethical artist and designer is that
the same activities of creation that support copyrightability of
the artist’s or designer’s own work will also support the
fairness of use of others’ works or their images or likenesses. If
the artist’s or designer’s motive is to be creative—to create new
content, meaning, and expression—and not exploitative—to rip
off another to avoid the drudgery of being creative—then the
artist’s or designer’s works will be copyrightable and uses of
others’ works and their names, images, and likenesses will be
fair and ethical. Exploitation of famous celebrity images follows
the same path: depiction of a celebrity to communicate the
meaning or message or the actual attributes of the celebrity
herself, absent any commentary on or criticism of the meaning
and message or symbolism of the celebrity or her actions, is
very likely to be found to be an unethical and unlawful
exploitation of the celebrity’s publicity rights. If an artist
depicts a celebrity for the purpose of criticizing the celebrity,

165. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569–78
(1977).
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her use is likely to be found to be fair. Alternatively, if the
artist modifies the celebrity image’s appearance with a highly
stylized, recognizable method or technique that is original and
readily attributable to the artist (i.e., Modify It Obviously),
then the artist has greatly improved her chances of success in a
right of publicity claim.
The DIOS MIO recommendation reminds artists and
designers that plagiaristic motives are recognized in the arts as
well as in literary and academic endeavors. Crass exploitation
of valuable works or celebrity images so that the expressive
value of these works or images might be credited to the artist
as new, creative expression conceived of and executed by the
artist will be regarded as an act of unfair and unethical
exploitation. The label—copycat, derivative, infringer, pirate, or
plagiarist—is not as important as the motivation that is
coupled with the action. The gray and black areas of potentially
unethical behavior are avoided if you “Don’t Include Other’s
Stuff, or Modify It Obviously.”

